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Life-cycle analysis of flow-assisted nickel zinc-, manganese dioxide-, and valve-regulated lead-acid batteries designed for demand-charge reduction

Keith M. Gregory | Los Angeles Partner | Snell & Wilmer

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) | US Army War College

Title : Survey of DoD Profit Policy and Further Analysis of the Estimation Theory
The TRICARE Evaluation, Analysis and Management Support (TEAMS) contract is a multiple-award vehicle and one of the largest federal government Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract opportunities Deloitte has secured.

2017 Conference - Schedule - National Hearing …


"Deloitte was awarded this opportunity because of our specific blend of commercial health care and federal client service experience, our broad portfolio of methodologies and consulting capabilities, and demonstrated capacity to quickly mobilize and deploy the right teams of experiencedprofessionals at the right time to help DoD address their needs," said Gregory Scott, principal, Deloitte Consulting LLP and MHS Account Lead.

 

blacklion7l | Intelligence, Defense, and US National …


The Department of Defense (DOD) components GAO selected for review have begun implementing insider-threat programs that incorporate the six minimum standards called for in Executive Order 13587 to protect classified information and systems. For example, the components have begun to provide insider-threat awareness training to all personnel with security clearances. In addition, the components have incorporated some of the actions associated with a framework of key elements that GAO developed from a White House report, an executive order, DOD guidance and reports, national security systems guidance, and leading practices recommended by the National Insider Threat Task Force. However, the components have not consistently incorporated all recommended key elements. For example, three of the six components have developed a baseline of normal activity—a key element that could mitigate insider threats. DOD components have not consistently incorporated these key elements because DOD has not issued guidance that identifies recommended actions beyond the minimum standards that components should take to enhance their insider-threat programs. Such guidance would assist DOD and its components in developing and strengthening insider-threat programs and better position the department to safeguard classified information and systems.


DOD and others, such as the National Insider Threat Task Force, have assessed the department's insider-threat program, but DOD has not analyzed gaps or incorporated risk assessments into the program. DOD officials believe that current assessments meet the intent of the statute that requires DOD to implement a continuing gap analysis. However, DOD has not evaluated and documented the extent to which the current assessments describe existing insider-threat program capabilities, as is required by the law. Without such a documented evaluation, the department will not know whether its capabilities to address insider threats are adequate and address statutory requirements. Further, national-level security guidance states that agencies, including DOD, should assess risk posture as part of insider-threat programs. GAO found that DOD components had not incorporated risk assessments because DOD had not provided guidance on how to incorporate risk assessments into components' programs. Until DOD issues guidance on incorporating risk assessments, DOD components may not conduct such assessments and thus not be able to determine whether security measures are adequate.


Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Recommendation: To further enhance the department's efforts to protect its classified information and systems from insider threats, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to evaluate and document the extent to which current assessments provide a continuing analysis of gaps for all DOD components; report to Congress on the results of this evaluation; and direct that the overall results of these self- and independent assessments be reviewed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Newsletter - National League of POWMIA Families

just_li This incident, IF CONFIRMED, would offer a useful counterexample to critics who maintain that small impactors cannot start fires because, for example, the meteoroid is "cold." just_li As of March, 1997, reseachers who have visited the San Luis site of the landslide do not believe there was an impact at this location.